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SHUSHING THE NEW AESTHETIC
VOCABULARY: APPROPRIATION ART UNDER
THE CANADIAN COPYRIGHT REGIME

KAREN LOWE†
In adopting pre-existing works as source material to convey new meanings and
understandings, appropriation art is an integral avenue of artistic expression.
However, the narrow fair dealing exception provides little protection to artists
who engage in this form of social commentary, a form which necessitates
reproducing the original copyrighted work for a successful referential analysis.
This paper will explore the unique challenge that appropriation art poses to the
Canadian copyright law. As a preliminary matter, the author will discuss the
conceptual basis behind this aesthetic practice and situate it within traditional
notions of authorship. The author moves on to examine the current Canadian
jurisprudence under the case of Michelin and compares this approach to
American developments under its broader fair use doctrine. It is argued that
the fate of appropriation art as a legally valid practice largely depends on the
recognized policy objectives of a given copyright regime. While developments
in Théberge and CCH Canadian Ltd. seem to offer hope to the appropriation
artist, short of a possible Charter challenge to the Copyright Act, they do little
to change the exhaustive nature of the fair dealing exceptions. The author
concludes that the most viable solution to accommodating appropriation art
in the Canadian copyright regime is through statutory reform akin to the more
flexible fair use standard.

Karen Lowe is in her third year of the LL.B. Programme at Dalhousie University. She
attended the University of Victoria’s International Intellectual Property Programme in the
summer of 2006. After she completes her degree, she will be articling at Miller Thomson
LLP in Vancouver.
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All authorship is fertilized by the work of prior authors, and the
echoes of old work in new work extend beyond ideas and concepts to
a wealth of expressive details. Indeed, authorship is the transformation
and recombination of expressions into new molds, the recasting and
revision of details into different shapes. What others have expressed,
and the ways they have expressed it, are the essential building blocks
of any creative medium…The use of the work of other authors in one’s
own work inheres in the authorship process.1
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At one
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke.2

INTRODUCTION

The great Spanish painter, Pablo Picasso, once remarked, “[t]he artist is a
receptacle for the emotions that come from all over the place: from the sky,
from the earth, from a scrap of paper, from a passing shape, from a spider’s
web”.3 Artists have historically drawn inspiration from their surroundings,
each new landscape and vista being a potential starting point for artistic
expression to take flight. However, given the increasingly ubiquitous nature
of commercial and mass-mediated images in our daily lives, it should not
come as a surprise that these images are integral to the artistic expressions of
our times. The ever-imposing billboards, the omnipresent advertisements in
bathroom stalls, classrooms, and ‘Google Earth’ searches – these make up the
new aesthetic vocabulary in an emerging postmodern artistic practice coined
‘appropriation art’.4
1

Jessica Litman, “Copyright as Mythe” (1991) 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235 at 243-44.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lothography Co., 188 U.S. 239 at 251 (1903) [Bleistein].
3
“Pablo Picasso Quotes,” online: Artquotes.net < http://www.artquotes.net/masters/
picasso_quotes.htm>.
4 See also John Carlin, “Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property
Law” (1988) 13 Colum.-V.L.A. J.L. & Arts 103 at para 111:“In the present century,
culture functions as the ideal artistic referent…contemporary artists should be free to
reproduce our ‘nature’ even if some of it is made of commercial signs and imagery
protected by copyright”.
2
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Appropriation art can be described as “a postmodern technique using images
fundamental to a culture (and therefore not created by the artist, who creates
from the standpoint of the outsider) to make a point about that culture”.5 It
is a practice that functions by using pre-existing works, oftentimes entire
works, and adopting them as source material to convey new messages and
understandings. Appropriation has been well-accepted in the art world as
a valid and significant technique, utilized by noted artists including French
artist Marcel Duchamp, and the influential American pop-artist, Andy
Warhol.6 However, what may be called ‘appropriating’ or ‘borrowing’ in the
art world raises legal concerns respecting copyright infringement, especially
because the elements that comprise the new aesthetic vocabulary are often
copyrighted works. The practice of appropriation necessarily competes with
copyright interests, because the law prohibits substantial reproduction of
copyrighted works.7 Consequently, the question in most cases is not whether
the copyright holder’s right has been infringed, but rather, whether the
artist can show her dealing is nevertheless allowable under the fair dealing
exception.
Canadian copyright jurisprudence in respect to appropriation works is
a murky, uncharted terrain, owing largely to the extremely narrow scope
of the fair dealing exceptions under the Copyright Act.8 The exhaustive list
5

Niels B. Schaumann, “An Artist’s Privilege” (1997) 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 249 at
252 [Schaumann].
6
Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. is a direct copy of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa with a moustache
painted on. It is said to be humorous comment on the original artist’s homosexuality.
Warhol was an American artist who is known for his paintings of American house hold
products such as Campbell’s Soup (1968), as well as his mass-produced silkscreen prints of
famous persons. See Elton Fukumoto, “The Author Effect After the ‘Death of the Author’:
Copyright in a Post-modern Age” (1997) 72 Wash. L. Rev. 903 at 919 [Fukumoto].
7
Appropriation art also raises issues of trademark and moral rights issues. See e.g.
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions 353 F.3d. 792 (9th Circ. 2003)[Mattel]. The
Court held the artist’s use of Mattel’s Barbie dolls in his photographs did not infringe the
plaintiff’s trademark because any public interest in free and artistic expression outweighed
the plaintiff’s interest in any potential consumer confusion. See also Patricia Loughlan,
“Moral Rights (A View from the Town Square)” (2000) Media & Arts Law Review 1,
where the author argues that, “moral rights, by canonizing the artist and consecrating the
work, may function to separate the discursive practices of art from daily life and thereby
inhibits art’s cultural and political power”.
8
R.S.C. 1985, C-42 [Copyright Act or Act].
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of protected purposes under fair dealing does not include parody, a purpose
that has been successfully relied upon as a defence by American artists under
the broader and more flexible fair use doctrine. The current uncertainty
stifles artistic expression, as hesitant Canadian artists fear being exposed to
liability. They must tread lightly in deciding what ‘mirror’ to use in order
to evince a telling social commentary while also according with the law. At
the same time, the ever-shrinking public domain fails to benefit from these
invaluable intellectual works. As Justice Leval enunciated, “[m]onopoly
protection of intellectual property that impede[s] referential analysis and the
development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process”.9
This paper will explore the unique challenge that appropriation art poses to
the Canadian copyright regime, and argue that the Canadian fair dealing
provisions must be reformed to accommodate appropriation practices as
integral avenues of artistic expression. Part I will discuss the conceptual basis
of appropriation art, and how it is situated in direct opposition to copyright
law. Part II will examine the Canadian jurisprudence on appropriation art in
the leading decision of Cie Générale des Éstablissements Michelin-Michelin
& Cie v. C.A.W., 10 and compare this approach to American developments
under its fair use doctrine. It will discuss how the fate of appropriation art as
a legally valid practice largely depends on the recognized policy objectives
of a given copyright regime. Part III will survey the available avenues to
ameliorate the Canadian jurisprudence with that of the United States, in light
of recent developments by the Supreme Court of Canada. It will conclude
that despite these promising developments, the only realistic solution is that
of parliamentary reform.

9

Pierre J. Leval, J., “Toward a Fair Use Standard” (1990) Harv. L. Rev. 1105 at 1109
[Leval]. Justice Leval’s article was formative in the development of the transformative
use test under the fair use doctrine, and has been copiously cited by subsequent American
case law.
10
(1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (F.C.T.D.) [Michelin].
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PART I: A PRIMER ON APPROPRATION ART
AS POSTMODERN PRACTICE

An examination of appropriation art reveals a number of conceptual
frameworks that provide an impetus to this particular type of aesthetic
practice. Firstly, appropriation art stands as a form of social critique. It is a
commentary that sheds light on the pervasive nature of commercial images
and how the prevalence of mass media in our society has come to dominate
our understandings and the way in which we make meaning in our daily
lives. By taking a well known, ordinary image that is part of our collective
consciousness and reframing it in a way that is strange and unordinary
to the viewer, the appropriation artist can question taken for granted
assumptions:
When an artist appropriates an existing image from mass
culture, takes it out of context and places it in a gallery…,
the viewer will often examine that image much more closely
than she would if she found it on the pages of a magazine.
In the process, she may discover that the values embodied
in that image, of really ‘seeing’ it, has forced her to consider
the operation of a process that she performs uncritically
everyday.11
In a series of black and white pencil sketches entitled There must be 50 ways
to kill your lover, nationally-renowned Canadian artist, Diane Thorneycroft
depicts familiar wives from popular culture murdering their husbands.12 For
instance, in one piece, Thorneycroft portrays Miss Piggy happily enjoying
a martini, after just having strangled Kermit the Frog who is shown lying
on the floor breathlessly clutching his neck. Another sketch depicts Marge
Simpson grinning with Homer Simpson’s lifeless body on her lap. She has
11

E. Kenly Ames, “Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation”
(1993) 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1473 at 1481-2 [Ames].
12
Robert Enright, “She’s known for stirring up controversy. But when Diane
Thorneycroft sketched a murdered Mickey and Big Bird in bondage, it appeared she’d
gone a bit too far” The Globe and Mail (31 July 2002) R1 [Enright].
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stabbed him in the chest, and a pool of blood collects beneath him. In
showing these familiar pop cultural characters in this way, Thorneycroft is
seeking to comment on the way in which violence is portrayed in the media,
particularly in television programs which target younger audiences. The
audience is challenged to view each character differently as opposed to its
original context on television.
Compared to other artistic mediums in which appropriation practices
are used, appropriation in visual art is the most powerful and effective
medium for questioning societal norms because of its non-verbal aspect.13
Each individual viewer who interprets Thorneycroft’s violently anomalous
sketches is free to interpret them personally, to make his or her own meaning
out of what is conveyed. The interpretation also works on a collective level
since the source material, here being personalities that often enter our living
rooms, are part of our broader social consciousness:
This ability to function on several different levels at once
is not unique to visual arts, but, because images are more
open to individual interpretation than verbal forms are the
visual arts are more widely suited to conveying a message
of social criticism to many viewers while stimulating the
individual viewer to articulate her particular understanding
of the message itself. 14
However, because of this visual aspect, appropriation practices in visual art
pose the greatest challenge to copyright law compared to literary or digital
music sampling. A writer can make discrete selections from the original source
material in order to draw the needed reference. This is not the case with the
visual arts, where the artist will almost always require the entire original work
to make a sufficient reference for with which viewers will associate.15
Beyond challenging the social norms represented by the original work, the
particular act of appropriating the original work conveys a powerful message.
13
14
15

Ames, supra note 11 at 1482.
Ibid. at 1483.
See generally supra note 11.
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In this way, appropriation art is part of a broader postmodern movement
that seeks to confront the very notions of originality and authorship that
are fundamental to the copyright law system. Appropriation art can thus
be seen as a discursive practice that challenges the process of creation and
innovation, and the Lockean assumptions that often serve to justify the
rights conferred upon authors. By using the primary work as raw material in
the secondary work, appropriation artists undermine the romantic view of
the author as an individual creative genius; it is a statement that the author
does not create in a vacuum.
In “The Author Effect after the ‘Death of the Author’: Copyright in a Postmodern Movement”, Elton Fukumoto traces the idea of the author alongside
the Lockean approach to individual property. He describes the romantic
notion of the author as the idea that the author is “an individual who is
solely responsible – and therefore exclusively deserving of credit – for the
production of the new work”.16 The concept of authorship coincides with
Lockean justifications for the conferral of property rights. Lockean natural
rights theory posits that one should reap the benefits of his labour.17 Applied
to copyright, the theory would attribute the author as the sole source
of creativity and originality, and therefore deserved of the rights to his
intellectual works to the exclusion of others. The act of appropriating is a
direct challenge against the assumptions of authorship; it is a clear statement
of defiance, asserting the artistic and creative process is necessarily a collective
process that draws on the ideas and works of others.18
In calling his studio the ’Factory’, pop-artist Andy Warhol was said to be
commenting on the different perspectives and ideas that make up the process
16

Fukumoto, supra note 6 at 906.
See especially Carys J. Craig, “Locke, Labour & Limiting the Authors’ Rights: A
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law” (2002) 28 Queen’s L.J. 1 at
para 2. Craig argues “the deontological explanation for copyright law framed in Lockean
natural rights rhetoric and, and loaded with presumptions of moral entitlement, inevitably
distort rather than facilitate a nuanced understanding of the copyright system”.
18
See generally Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain” (1990) 20 Emory L.J. 965 at
1019. “Originality is a conceit, but we like it. To the extent that we are tempted to forget
that originality is a conceit, it can be a dangerous principle on which to base a property
system”.
17
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of art. Warhol’s multi-screen images of Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, and
Jackie Onassis made him a household name in American popular culture.
Numerous artisans were involved in the creation of his pieces: one artist
would create a silkscreen print of an image selected by Warhol, and other
artists were involved in carrying the work to its completion. Art historians
have often viewed Warhol’s collaborative ‘Factory’ as an emphasis that the
artistic process is ultimately communal rather than individual.19 With this
view in mind, a Lockean approach to authorship is turned on its head. Every
contributor to the final product would deserve a property interest in the
final product. Appropriation art can thus been seen as a discursive attempt
to broaden the public domain and widen the ambit of expressions and
intellectual works for society to flourish:
A technique of critical discourse appropriation defies
the very structure that copyright serves to protect. It is
manifest a rejection of private property in favour of a more
communitarian conception of society. Therefore, the act of
appropriation itself imparts a political message; it reveals
that society (and its legal system) is laden with assumptions
that financial incentives promote individual creativity, and
that property interests supersede society’s right of access to
information.20
Seen in this way, appropriation art can stand in direct opposition to the
purposes of copyright. However, as the following jurisprudence will show,
this relationship largely depends on the accepted underlying objectives of
a given copyright regime. The Canadian copyright regime that has, until
recently, taken on a more natural-rights-based objective maintains the
opposition; an incentive-based system such as that of the United States aligns
the valuable artistic expressions of appropriation art with the fundamental
public purpose of copyright.

19

Patricia A. Krieg, “Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts” (1983) 93 Yale L.J.
1565 at 1579.
20
Ibid. at 1578.
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PART II – THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE ON
APPROPRIATION PRACTICES

A. The Canadian Fair Dealing Exception
The current jurisprudence in respect to parody in Canada does not bode well
for appropriation practices. On the surface it could be argued there is lack
of certainty in the case law. However, a close examination of the Canadian
Copyright Act makes it clear that recontextualized works such as those of
Thorneycroft’s plainly run afoul of the copyright owner’s monopoly, and
would not be justified under the very narrow fair dealing provisions as they
currently stand.
The fair dealing exceptions under section 29 allow use of copyrighted works
which would otherwise be an infringement,21 regardless of whether or not a
license was available. To qualify under fair dealing, the would-be infringer
must demonstrate that (1) the dealing is for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism or news reporting; (2) the dealing is fair; and (3) the
source is mentioned with the name of the author. The statute itself does not
define what constitutes ‘fair’, leaving this determination to develop through
judicial precedence. It should be noted that the list of fair dealing purposes
is an exhaustive list; therefore, a given dealing that is in fact ‘fair’ will not
qualify under the fair dealing exception if it is not for the purpose of research,
criticism or news reporting.
To date, the leading Canadian case in respect to parody under the fair dealing
exception is the Federal Court decision of Michelin. In 1994, the defendant
union tried to organize a bargaining unit for three Michelin manufacturing
plants in Nova Scotia. In an attempt to rally support, the union distributed
21

First the copyright holder must show the defendant has infringed his copyright in a
work. This demonstration requires that the copyright owner prove (1) the defendant had
access to the original work and (2) the infringing work is ‘substantially similar’ to the
copyrighted work. Caron Association des Pompiers de Montreal (1992), 42 C.P.R. (3d)
292 (F.C.T.D.).
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leaflets that depicted a rendition of Michelin’s mascot, Bibendum, in a way
that ridiculed the employer’s management tactics. For instance, one drawing
showed a Michelin employee about to be crushed under the heels of an
ominous Bibendum. Michelin immediately brought suit, alleging the union’s
use of Bibendum was an infringement of its copyright.22 Justice Teitelbaum
did not hesitate in finding the union had reproduced a substantial part of
Michelin’s Bibendum design.23 This finding does not come as a surprise,
seeing as a successful parody must refer the viewer to the original work. The
union raised two arguments in its defence: firstly, that their use of Bibendum
was justified under fair dealing, and in the alternative, that their inability
to use Bibendum was a violation of their freedom of expression right under
section 2(b) of the Charter.24
The union’s claim that its use of Bibendum was justified under the fair dealing
exception was strictly rejected. Firstly, Justice Teitelbaum made it clear that
the union’s parodic use failed to meet the requirements of criticism within the
meaning of section 29: “Under the Copyright Act, ‘criticism’ is not synonymous
with parody. Criticism requires analysis and judgment of a work that sheds
light on the original”.25 Furthermore, a reading of the Copyright Act meant
that the purposes enumerated under section 29 was an exhaustive list, barring
the Court from reading in parody as a new exception on its own right. Justice
Teitelbaum explained it was not within the Court’s role to read in parody as an
included fair dealing exception, because such an inclusion was solely within
Parliament’s authority.26 Thus, the fair dealing analysis was truncated by a
failure to fit the union’s use within the purposes of section 29, largely due to
the narrowly defined exceptions that do not include parody.
To fully understanding the Court’s reasoning in Michelin it is integral to note
that at the time of the decision, the sole purpose of Canadian copyright law
22

Michelin, supra note 10 at 73.
Michelin, supra note 10 at 55.
24
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [Charter].
25
Michelin, supra note 10 at 66.
26
Ibid. at para. 68: “exceptions to copyright infringement should be strictly interpreted. I
am not prepared to read in parody as a form of criticism and thus create a new exception
under section 27(2)(a.1)”.
23
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was to convey a just reward to the author. The purpose of the Canadian
copyright regime is not stated explicitly in the statute, leaving it up to the
judiciary to respond through evolving case law. At the time of Michelin,
the jurisprudence did not recognize the furthering of the public interest as
a policy objective; any concept of weighing the author’s monopoly with a
public benefit was not in the Court’s mindset. Justice Teitelbaum followed
the earlier decision of Bishop v. Stephens,27 and held that the express purpose
of Canadian copyright is “the protection of authors and ensuring that
they are recompensed for their creative energies and works”.28 The Court’s
narrow approach to fair dealing, its lack of principled reasoning in favour
for technical requirements flows directly from this sole purpose. This
natural-rights, Lockean-based interpretation yields an extremely restrictive
approach to fair dealing. It also yields values of moral entitlement, which
materialized in Justice Teitelbaum’s obvious distaste for the union’s use of
Bibendum in their organizing pamphlets.29
Given the narrowly-defined sole purpose of copyright, a dismissal of the
union’s freedom of expression argument effortlessly followed. Applying
the test set out in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G)30 the union’s adaptation
of Bibendum was an example of expression. In other words, the pamphlets
met the low threshold of “attempt[ing] to convey meaning”.31 However,
Justice Teitelbaum was adamant in concluding that the union’s expression
incorporating Bibendum was a prohibited form of expression within the
meaning of section 2(b) because one cannot use another’s property to assert
a freedom of expression right:

27

[1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 at 473-474. See also Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.,

[1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 373.
28

Michelin, supra note 10 at 115.
“Since the Defendants have shown little creativity in depicting the “Bibendum”, I do
not	

    accept	

    the	

    Defendants’	

    contention	

    that	

    their	

    creativity	

    is	

    being	

    fatally	

    stiﬂed	

    by	

    a	

    
repressive copyright regime.” Ibid. at para. 76; “To accept the Defendant’s submission on
parody [as fair dealing] would be akin to making the parody label the last refuge of the
scoundrel…” Ibid. at para. 75.
30
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
31
Ibid. at para. 91.
29
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The freedom guaranteed by the Charter is a freedom to
express and communicate ideas without restraint, whether
orally or in print or by other means of communication. It is
not a freedom to use someone else’s property to do so. It gives
no right to anyone to use someone else’s land or platform to
make a speech, or someone else’s printing press to publish
his ideas. It gives no right to anyone to enter and use a
public building for such purposes.32
Since there had not been any intellectual property cases dealing with the
issue of freedom of expression, Justice Teitelbaum relied upon real property
cases to draw an analogy. The pre-Charter decision of Harrison v. Carswell33
was referred to, where the defendant was unsuccessful in arguing that her
freedom of expression right included the right to picket on the plaintiff ’s
property.
Had the union been successful in establishing a section 2(b) freedom of
expression violation, the Court ruled that this violation would have been
demonstrably justified pursuant to the Oakes test under section 1 of the
Charter.34 It had already been well-established that the purpose of Canadian
copyright was solely to reward the author. Justice Teitelbaum’s section 1
analysis that followed was a direct outcome of this sole purpose. Because
the Court found “the protection of authors and ensuring that they are
recompensed for their creative energies and works is an important value in a
democratic society in and of itself ”,35 the union had no chance of succeeding
under the Charter challenge. As Carys Craig explains, “[h]aving identified
the ultimate purpose of the Copyright Act as the protection of authors – and
not, say, the public interest in encouraging creativity and the dissemination
of intellectual works – the Court could hardly avoid the conclusion that
32

Ibid. at para. 96 [emphasis added].
(1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68.
34
R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-139. Once the claimant successfully establishes
a prima facie Charter infringement, the onus shifts to the government actor to show the
infringement	

    is	

    nonetheless	

    justiﬁed	

    in	

    a	

    fair	

    and	

    democratic	

    society:	

    The	

    test	

    asks	

    (1)
Whether there is a pressing and substantial objective and (2) whether the means chosen
are proportional to this objective.
35
Michelin, supra note 10 at 115.
33
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enforcing the author’s monopoly is a rational and efficient means of achieving
that purpose”.36
As the law currently stands after Michelin, the only way for an appropriation
artist to escape liability under the Copyright Act is either to obtain a license
from the copyright holder or to avoid a finding of infringement altogether
by not reproducing a substantial portion of the original work. The facts
in Michelin demonstrate the sheer impossibility of a licensing agreement.
Undoubtedly, Michelin would not have conferred a license to the union
allowing it to ridicule Bibendum, and to further its collective organizing
objectives. Legal scholars have strongly criticized that Michelin effectively
allows the copyright holder to exercise their right as a form of private
censorship.37
Moreover, the second option, that of avoiding a prima facie finding of
infringement, is in actuality a non-option as far as a successful appropriation
work is concerned. As critics of Michelin have argued, a parody that does not
substantially copy the criticized work so that the original is recognizable is
not a successful parody.38 Parody, and appropriation works in general require
that the viewer associate with the original work for the commentary to have
its effect. For example, in an earlier collection of drawings and photographs
entitled Foul Play, Thorneycroft depicted well-known children’s cartoon
characters being hung and massacred.39 Her objective was to comment on
the hypocritical way in which society views violence – that violence is largely
acceptable in child’s play. After a warning from a lawyer who sat on the
gallery board of directors, Thorneycroft decided to substitute copyrighted
characters with generic toys, while altering other characters so they were
36

	

    Carys	

    J.	

    Craig,	

    “Putting	

    the	

    Community	

    in	

    Communication:	

    Dissolving	

    the	

    Conﬂict	

    
Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 75 at 91.
37
See especially David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression
and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 175 at 197.
38
See Gregor P. Binkley “The Judicial Treatment of Fair Dealing and Freedom of
Expression	

    in	

    Michelin	

    v.	

    C.A.W.”	

    (2000)	

    17	

    C.I.P.R.	

    225;	

    Jane	

    Bailey,	

    “Deﬂating	

    the	

    
Michelin Man: Protecting Users’ Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process”
in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 125.
39
Enright, supra note 12.
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no longer recognizable. This had a compromising effect on her intended
commentary because the viewer could not properly associate with the
reference:
I did a drawing of a snowman that died of massive head
injuries and it just isn’t the same thing as Goofy dying of
massive head injuries. We know how Goofy walks and talks,
and we can hear him in our heads, whereas the snowman
doesn’t have a history. I can’t tell you how disappointed I
am.40
B. The American Fair Use Doctrine
Compared to the Canadian Copyright Act, the purpose of American copyright
is directly stated in a constitutional directive: “To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”.
41
The cornerstone of the American copyright system is based upon an
incentive theory; copyright is meant to reward a monopoly right to authors
in so far as it provides an incentive for authors to create and contribute to the
overall objective. Although scholars have often used the rhetoric of the dual
objectives of copyright, the constitutional directive explicitly recognizes that
in the end, the public interest is the primary objective:
It should not be forgotten that the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to use one’s expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas. 42
The different approach to fair use in the American jurisprudence compared
to the Canadian approach in Michelin flows directly from the fundamentally
different purposes of the respective copyright regimes.

40
41
42

Thorneycroft, cited in Enright, supra note 12.
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.8 [emphasis added].
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 at 539.
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Once the copyright holder has established an infringement, the fair use
doctrine allows the alleged infringer to nonetheless justify the use if it is seen
as ‘fair’ and for purposes including criticism, comment, news reporting or
teaching. §107 then goes on to list a number of non-exhaustive factors a court
should consider in determining whether the use is fair. A determination of
fair use requires a case by case analysis, considering these four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 43
Since copyright confers an economic reward to authors, there is no real
justification for limiting uses of the copyrighted work that do not harm
the author’s economic interest under this incentive-based system.44 The
fair use doctrine can thus be seen as a way to allow for uses of copyright
works to ensure that the author’s economic reward does not impair the
ultimate objective of public benefit. Because the list of fair use examples
is not exhaustive, a purpose that does not fit neatly under the enumerated
examples may still be justifiable if the use is ‘fair’.
A determination under the fair use doctrine necessitates that the courts
undergo a balancing of interests. Using the four factors, a judge will weigh
the impairment to the author’s economic interest compared to the public
43
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benefit of access, keeping in mind that the public interest is the ultimate
goal of copyright.45 Because the fair use doctrine is so flexible, it allows the
courts to consider the underlying copyright objective of promoting the
public interest: “Courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement
must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maximum
financial return to the greater public interest in development of art.” 46 This
flexibility was intended by the framers of the American Copyright Act to
enable the judiciary to adapt the fair use doctrine to new fact situations and
technologies.47
American courts have welcomed parody as a valid purpose under the fair
use doctrine and have been generally willing to recognize parody as a viable
art forum. Irving Berlin et al. v. E.C. Publications, Inc.. was the first American
case to recognize parody as a justifiable purpose under the fair use defence:
“[A]s a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving
of substantial freedom – both as entertainment and as a form of social and
literary criticism”.48 The courts have also sought to protect parody because of
the practical reason that a copyright holder will unlikely license a work to be
subject to ridicule or criticism, even if this criticism were to serve a greater
public good.49 Despite the inclusion of parody under the fair use doctrine,
the first appropriation art case to make its way into the courts did not side
so favourably in the public interest.50 Rogers v. Koons showed that although
purposes of parody could be equated with fair use, appropriation practices
didn’t necessarily fit within the paradigm of parody.51
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1. Rogers v. Koons
California photographer Art Rogers brought suit against contemporary
artist Jeff Koons, alleging Koons’ String of Puppies sculpture infringed the
copyright of his 1980 Puppies photograph. Koons’ sculpture was part of
the Banality Show, exhibited at New York’s Sonnabend Gallery in 1988. In
fact, Koons modeled his larger than life sculpture after a postcard of Rogers’
photograph that he had bought in 1987 at an airport gift shop. Rogers’
photograph was a shot of a couple holding puppies on a park bench. Koons
included a number of modifications to Rogers’ work. Koons’ sculpture
was entirely blue, included changes to the couples’ facial expressions and
depicted the couple with flowers in their hair. 52 Koons claimed his purpose
of using Rogers’ photo was to comment on the works lack of creativity – that
Rogers’ work was a typical, generic photograph and as such perfect fodder
for his Banality Show: “It was only a postcard photo and I gave it spirituality,
animation and took it to another vocabulary”. 53
In reasoning that Koons’ use was not ‘fair’, the Court focused on the
technical requirement of parody and emphasized that a parody must
criticize the original work.54 Whether Koons’ sculpture furthered the
purposes of copyright was of little importance in the Court’s reasoning. As
one commentator remarks, “[b]y not addressing the critical purpose of the
work, its importance as an example of kitsch and its place in art history and
postmodernism the Court neatly sidestepped any real understanding of the
work itself ”.55 Even more, the decision is noticeably laced with the Court’s
value judgement of Koons’ artistic merit.56 However, the Court’s approach
in Rogers comes as no surprise since it was the first time an American court
had to grapple with the emerging practices of postmodern art. In the seminal
decision of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. that followed, the United
States Supreme Court made a marked turn towards accepting appropriation
52
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practices.57 The Court’s reasoning showed that the fair use doctrine is capable
of accommodating appropriation as a valid art form.
2. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
In Campbell, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 2Live Crew’s
commercial rap parody of Roy Orbison’s “O, Pretty Woman” was justified
as fair use. It was emphasized that all of the four fair use factors should be
weighed and considered together; not one factor is determinative of the
issue. Therefore, the courts below erred in barring the defence of fair use
merely on the basis that the song was a commercial parody.58 Campbell is
integral to fitting appropriation practices within the framework of copyright,
firstly because it introduced the ‘transformative use’ test to a determination
of fair use, and secondly because it recognized that parody requires the use
of pre-existing material to comment on the original work and that this use
was justifiable due to the social value of parody. The Court adopted Justice
Leval’s proposed test for transformative use, which asks, “whether the new
work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks it in other words,
whether and to what extent the new work is transformative”.59 Applying the
test to the facts of the case, the Court found that 2 Live Crew’s song, in
juxtaposing “the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true with
degrading taunts and a bawdy demand for sex” 60 was transformative.
The issue of transformativeness is meant to colour the entire fair use analysis.
The Court emphasized that the more transformative the work’s purpose,
the less important the other three factors are against a finding of fair use.61
For example, the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the original
work used, is often seen as the largest hurdle for a re-contextualized work
under the fair use analysis. However, the transformative use test adopted
in Campbell dictates that the amount used depends on the transformative
57
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character and purpose of the use. Justice Souter wrote, “[w]hen parody
takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure
up’ at least enough of the original to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable”.62 Transformative use also accords with the fourth factor, the
effect of the use on the original’s market. If a work is truly transformative,
if it adds new meaning to the original, it will necessarily serve a different
purpose compared to the original work. In that way, it is unlikely that the
parody will serve as a market substitute for the original. Assuming the given
parody is in fact transformative, since parody and the parodied work serve
different functions the parody will unlikely pose a commercial threat to the
original’s market.63
In taking a principled approach to fair use, Campbell can be seen as a
landmark case for opening up the possibility for appropriation art to flourish
under the American copyright regime. Justice Souter wrote,
[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works. Such works lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright.64
As a critical art form that seeks to challenge social norms, the goal of
appropriation art is necessarily to add new meaning that is totally different
than the original work. Although it was not based on a visual artwork, cases
that followed Campbell have shown its groundbreaking precedence in paving
the way for the recognition of appropriation practices as not only a valid art
form; it recognized appropriation techniques as an expressive practice that
actually furthers the objectives of American copyright.
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Despite the progressive step taken by the Court in Campbell, proponents
of appropriation practices were not entirely satisfied with the decision
because it was not based on visual work, but on lyrics as a literary work. In
respect to the amount of the original work used, the Court stated that the
secondary artist can “‘conjure up’ at least enough of the original to make
the object of its critical wit recognizable”.65 Commentators were concerned
that this threshold suits the purposes of literary works, but is inadequate
in accommodating visual artists who often use the entire original work to
make an adequate reference:
This factor probably presents the largest obstacle to finding
that a re-contextualized work constitutes fair use based on
the quantitatively large amount of copyright material that
will generally be used. …[I]f courts are willing to accept
re-contexualization as a valid transformative purpose
because it is a common post-modern form of expression,
then courts must be more lenient about allowing artists
to use as much as is necessary to successfully convey their
intended expressions. 66
Because Campbell was based on a literary work, the Court does not
explicitly state than an appropriation artist may lawfully use a copyrighted
work in its entirety. However, the following case of Mattel v. Walking
Mountain settled this issue.
3. Mattel v. Walking Mountain
The impact of Campbell on the legal validity of appropriation practices was
fully realized years later in the 2002 decision of Mattel v. Walking Mountain
Productions.67 In 1999 Mattel brought suit against photographer Tom
Forsythe in respect to his series of works entitled Food Chain Barbie. In the
78 photo series, Forsythe depicts nude Barbie dolls being attacked by vintage
appliances. For instance, in the photograph Mellow Yellow, Forsythe shows
a naked Barbie doll spinning on a vintage Kenmore rotisserie. The doll is
65
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still wide-eyed and smiling, gleaming under the yellowish orange oven light.
Another photograph entitled Fondue for Three portrays three Barbie heads
floating in a fondue pot, each head being pierced by a fondue fork.68 On August
22, 2001, the Court granted Forsythe’s motion for summary judgement,
holding his depictions of Mattel’s Barbie constituted fair use. Not only was
Mattel unsuccessful on appeal; the Court confirmed an order requiring that
Mattel pay Forsythe $2 million in attorney client fees, showing its disdain for
Mattel’s action which it found groundless and unreasonable.69
The Court was not hesitant in finding that Forsythe’s use of the Barbie dolls
was fair use, as evidenced by the granting of summary judgement. Aided by
expert testimony from aesthetic scholars, the Court accepted Forsythe was
commenting on the gender roles in society and the effect Barbie has had in
shaping our social norms. In this way, Forsythe gave a whole new context for
viewers to associate with Barbie in a different way, giving the dolls an entirely
new meaning.70 In Food Chain Barbie a viewer’s understanding of Barbie as
a household icon is transformed. The Court describes Forsythe’s message
as a “critique [of] the objectification of women associated with ‘Barbie’ and
to lambaste the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of
women as objects because that is what Barbie embodies”.71
The decision goes to great lengths to emphasize that the artistic merit of
Forsythe’s work is of no relevance under the fair use analysis. Instead, the
Court relied heavily on Justice Holmes’s often cited dictum in Bleistein: “it
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work]”.72 It was of no
concern whether or not Forsythe’s work was in good or bad taste. Mattel
tried to introduce evidence to show that the general public did not view
68
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Forsythe’s photographs as parody. It had taken surveys at various shopping
malls, gauging people’s reactions after being shown Forsythe’s works. This
survey evidence was frowned upon by the Court: “Use of surveys in assessing
parody would allow majorities to determine the parodic nature of a work
and possibly silence artistic creativity. Allowing majorities to determine
whether a work is parody would be greatly at odds with the purpose of the
fair use exception”.73 Indeed, the Court was careful to heed the warnings
of Justice Holmes; the reasoning is not coloured by opinions as to artistic
merit, compared to the earlier case of Rogers.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the Court’s reasoning was its recognition
that the third fair use factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used, poses a unique obstacle for visual appropriation art. Here, the Court
noted, “[b]ecause the copyright material is a doll design and the infringing
work is a photograph containing the doll, Forsythe, short of severing
the doll, must add to it by creating a context around it and capturing the
context in the photograph”.74 It found that the particular visual medium
used by Forsythe required the use of the entire Barbie doll. Furthermore,
Mattel’s argument that Forsythe exceeded the necessary amount was strictly
rejected: “We do not require parodic works to take the absolute minimum
amount of the copyrighted work possible.”75 The Court was merely applying
the transformative use test as set in Campbell to a visual work – that the
amount of the original work used depends on the character of the use, the
character in this case being a visual work. This settled the uncertainty left
after Campbell. It was a clear affirmation that an appropriation artist who
adopts the entire copyrighted work in order to make a successful reference
is not necessarily barred from relying on the fair use defence.76
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Throughout the Court’s reasoning, it is evident that the overall purpose of
promoting public access to intellectual works is a guiding concern. Even
more, the Court is not hesitant to incorporate free speech values into its
analysis of fair use and cautions that allowing Mattel’s claim would be
effectively allowing private censorship:
The public benefit in allowing artistic creativity and social
criticism to flourish is great…No doubt, Mattel would be
less likely to grant a license to an artist that intends to create
art that criticises and reflects negatively on Barbie’s image.
It is not in the public’s interest to allow Mattel complete
control over the kinds of artistic works that use Barbie as a
reference for criticism and comment.77
This decision is an unmistaken confirmation by the American courts that
commercial and pop cultural images can be lawfully appropriated so long as
the use is fair, bearing in mind their transformative use. It also shows that in
its application, the transformative use test is a useful, flexible measure that
allows the courts to be mindful of the public purpose objective of copyright
law rather than being preoccupied with technicalities.
4. Blanch v. Koons
The recent American decision dealing with appropriation art, Blanch v.
Koons, offers the most promising reasoning in favour of accommodating
appropriation art under copyright law.78 In 2005, photographer Andrea
Blanch filed suit against Koons for violating her copyright in a photograph
she had taken that appeared in Allure magazine.79 Koons scanned the photo
Silk Sandals, took out the background, and superimposed the image on an
inverted slant onto his Niagara painting. Niagara was commissioned in
2000 by Deutsche Bank and the Guggenheim Foundation as part of a seven
painting series called Easyfun-Ethereal. The painting shows four pairs of
women’s feet dangling over images of desserts and treats, with the waterfall
as a backdrop. In a court filing, Koons’ lawyer John Koegel wrote, “[Niagara]
77
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is an entirely new artistic work…that comments on and celebrates society’s
appetites and indulgences as reflected in and encouraged by a ubiquitous
barrage of advertising and promotional images of food, entertainment,
fashion and beauty”.80
The Court’s reasoning in Blanch is yet another encouraging step towards
the validity of appropriation art under the American copyright regime. It
picks up on the principles set out Campbell, showing that the transformative
use is capable of accommodating appropriation when applied flexibly
and guided by the overall public purpose of copyright. In assessing the
transformativeness of Koons’ use, Justice Sack compared the purpose of
Koons’ use with that of Blanch’s photograph. For instance, Koons testified,
“I want the viewer to think about his or her personal experience with these
objects, products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into
how these affect our lives”,81 and “by recontextualizing these fragments as
I do, I try to compel the viewer to break out of the conventional way of
experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by mass media”.82 When
viewed alongside Blanch’s purpose in her photograph, it is clear that the two
works are totally divergent: “I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense to
get more of a sexuality to the photographs”83. Judge Sack did not hesitate
in finding Niagara was a transformative use of Blanch’s photograph. The
testimony of the two artists readily showed Koons’ work as adding insight
and new understanding to Blanch’s original work. Because appropriation art
has an underlying purpose of critiquing the source material that is recast, it
will likely satisfy the comparing purpose analysis exemplified in this case.
Perhaps the strongest arsenal this decision provides appropriation artist is
the Court’s disregard for the technical requirements of parody as set out
in Rogers. The Court in Rogers was adamant that in order for a work to
qualify as a parody “the copied work must be, at least in part, an object of the
80
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parody”.84 This requirement did not preclude the Court from a finding of fair
use in this instance. That Niagara did not comment on Blanch’s photograph
per se did not pose as a technical obstacle against Koon’s defence because the
Court found Niagara fell under the heading of satire. As the list of purposes
under §107 is not exhaustive, parody is not the only classification on which
an artist can rely upon for a defence of fair use. Rather than requiring that
the secondary work critique the primary work, satire “can stand on its own
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing”.85
The adopted test for satire is much broader than that of parody, and asks
“whether Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch’s
image rather than merely to get attention or to avoid the drudgery of coming
up with something fresh”.86 This justification requirement may appear to be
an onerous threshold, but the Court’s reasoning shows that in respect to
artistic expression it is a very realistic threshold to meet. Again, quoting the
words of Justice Holmes from Bleistein, Judge Sack explained that it is not
within the Court’s role or expertise to judge the merits of Koons’ artistry or
his painting: “[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of a work,
outside the narrowest and most obvious limits”.87
The Court in Niagara is less concerned with pigeon-holing requirements,
and more concerned with using the transformative use test as a flexible tool
to further the public interest purpose of American copyright law. Judge Sack
was careful not to undergo a quality assessment of whether Niagara was a
work of art and, instead, gave considerable weight to Koons’ explanation for
his choice in referencing Silk Sandals:
Although the legs in ‘Silk Sandals’ might seem prosaic,
I considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my
painting rather than legs I might have photographed
myself…To me, the legs depicted in the Allure photograph
84
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are a fact in the world, something that everyone experiences
constantly…By using a fragment of the Allure photograph
in my painting, I thus comment upon the culture and
attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure Magazine.88
Judge Sack wrote, “[i]t seems clear enough to us that Koons’ use of a slick
fashion photograph allows him to satirize life as it appears when seen through
the prism of slick fashion photography”.89
The validity of appropriation art under the American copyright regime
has clearly evolved from the rigid stance taken in the first case of Rogers.
Since Campbell introduced Justice Leval’s transformative consideration
to the fair use analysis, it has provided a useful tool that allows the courts
to be guided by the ultimate public purpose of American copyright. If a
work is transformative, if it “adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character,”90 society would surely benefit from its added value
and meaning. Furthermore, the jurisprudence shows the American courts
are more willing to take on a principled approach to fair use, focusing on
the dissemination of works to further the purpose of copyright rather than
fixating over technicalities and strict definitions. Regardless of whether the
secondary work mimics the primary work, the work will still be open to
a fair use defence under a broader heading of satire. An artist who faces
the difficult judgement call as to whether or not he or she should adopt a
reference to a copyrighted work can find comfort in the courts’ growing
acceptance of this postmodern artistic practice. While the situation in
America has moved progressively towards a more user-friendly approach,
Michelin is still the leading case law in Canada. As it currently stands, the
Canadian jurisprudence is even more restrictive than Rogers; and Canadian
artists have little to find comfort in.
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PART III: AVENUES OF REFORM – TOWARDS
AN ARTIST-FRIENDLY STANDARD

It has been over ten years since Michelin silenced any chance of a judiciallyimposed parody exemption under Canadian fair dealing. Recent decisions by
the Supreme Court of Canada give reason to believe that Michelin would be
decided much differently by the courts today, regardless of any parliamentary
reform to the current fair dealing provisions. It could be strongly argued that
Canadian courts would approach an appropriation art fact situation such
as Michelin very differently. Firstly, several legal scholars have convincingly
argued that the Federal Court erred in its freedom of expression analysis in
Michelin. Also, in light of the recent turn in Canadian copyright pioneered by
the Supreme Court of Canada in the groundbreaking decisions of Théberge
v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc.91 and CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, 92 there is good reason to reconsider the judicial
authority of Michelin. However, despite the recent turn by the Supreme Court
of Canada, the following analysis will show that the most viable solution for
appropriation artists is through parliamentary reform.
Did the Court Err in Michelin?
Legal scholars have been quick to condemn the Court’s section 2(b) Charter
analysis in Michelin, primarily because of the ease to which the Court
dismisses the union’s claim. In particular, it has been strongly argued that
the Court failed to fully appreciate the conceptual difference between real
property and intellectual property rights. In “Deflating the Michelin Man –
Protecting User’s Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process”, Jane
Bailey makes notice of the unique non-rivalrous character of intellectual
property rights. Bailey writes, “Unlike real property, however, copyright
material is non-rivalrous – your use of my copyrighted material does not
preclude me from using it”.93 The Court did not come to terms with this
distinction. Instead, Justice Teitelbaum quickly silenced any issue, writing,
91
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“just because the [copyright] is intangible, it should not be any less worthy
of protection as a full property right”.94
Legal scholar Carys Craig also takes issue with the Court’s dismissive
stance, paying particular attention to the physical characteristics of real
property compared to that of intellectual property. Craig notes that there
is nothing inherently expressive about ownership in land. In comparison,
with copyrighted works the content that makes up the right is expressive in
itself. There is a difference between the physical ownership over a book as
property, and its content as a literary, expressive work. Copyrighted works as
expressions of ideas are exactly that – they are rights over expression. Craig
explains, “[v]iewed in this way, the difference between copyright’s intangible
subject matter and the tangible object of, say, land law is fundamentally
relevant to determining the limits of copyright in light of freedom of
expression values”.95
Furthermore, commentators have consistently maintained that the Court
in Michelin erred in ignoring the constitutional supremacy of the Charter.96
According to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Constitution,
including the Charter is the “supreme law of Canada”.97 Any law that is
inconsistent with the Charter is of no force or effect. The Supreme Court of
Canada has explicitly held that proprietary interests are not protected under
the Charter.98 Therefore, the employer’s copyright interest did not merit
Charter protection that would justify overriding the union’s freedom of
expression right. By giving the employer’s copyright and, in turn, the Copyright
Act greater status than a constitutionally enshrined freedom of expression
right, the Court in Michelin made a serious error that could warrant judicial
review. Bailey explains, “foreclosing the protection of certain expression
under section 2(b) on the basis that it conflicts with unentrenched property
rights directly contradicts the concept of constitutional paramountcy –
94
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with the unenshrined property right seemingly taking precedence over the
enshrined right to free expression”.99
The Developments in Théberge and CCH – New Hope for
Appropriation Artists?
In Théberge, the Supreme Court of Canada finally settled the longstanding
debate in respect to the policy objectives of Canadian copyright. The
judiciary, responding to a lack of consensus and clarity within the Act itself,
rejected the sole purpose objective that had subsisted since the inception of
the Act. The Court declared that a proper interpretation of the Copyright Act
reveals the dual purposes of the Act:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just reward for the creator…The proper balance
among these and other public policy objectives lies not only
in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight
to their limited nature… In interpreting the Copyright Act,
courts should strive to maintain an appropriate balance
between these two goals.100
Proponents of users’ rights saw the Court’s affirmative statement in Théberge
as a significant turn in Canadian copyright, a turn that would be realized in
the decision of CCH that shortly followed.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s expansive approach to fair dealing in CCH
followed logically from the balancing of the public interest and creator’s
rights. Building on the dual principles established in Théberge, the Court
adopted a purposive interpretation of the fair dealing provisions, asserting,
“The fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an
integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence….The fair dealing
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In
99
100
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order to maintain a proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner
and a users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively”.101 The Court
provided a framework for determining what constitutes ‘fair’ within the
meaning of section 29 that is similar to the four factors set out in §107 of
the United States Copyright Act. These factors include the purpose of the
dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount of dealing, and the effect of
dealing on the original work.102
Many commentators have rejoiced in the potential impact of the two
pioneering decisions. For example, Joliffe, Sartorio and Chenowith applaud
both the dual policy objectives and the expansive approach to fair dealing
as “the clearest recognition from a Canadian court that copyright is an
instrument of social utility. There are dangers both in overcompensating
and undercompensating the intellectual property holder”103. The writers
note that CCH puts Canadian copyright objectives in-line with those set
out in the American Constitution. However, while the dual purposes are
indeed a move towards the incentive approach, the decision of Théberge
does not put Canadian copyright objectives at complete parity with
American copyright.
Firstly, it should be noted that the ultimate goal of American copyright is
the promotion of intellectual works for the public good. The monopoly right
conferred to authors is only justified in so far as it provides an incentive to
further this overall objective.104 Théberge mandates that author’s rights and the
public interest are balanced as equal and competing interests. Consequently,
Canadian copyright jurisprudence still lacks the understanding of copyright
as only a vehicle towards the ultimate public good in having access to
creative works. Put simply, copyright should be seen as a means to an
end. As Craig argues, “[t]he copyright owner’s rights exist only through
that public interest and cannot be justified in spite of it”.105 For the artist,
101
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this fundamental conceptual difference will impede a full appreciation of
appropriation practices by Canadian courts. Teresa Scassa warns that the
Supreme Court of Canada’s dual purpose objective is just that – it is settled
by judge-made case law and not an affirmative statutory statement as is the
case in the United States. She writes, “[t]he balancing approach, while in
some cases offering greater scope to the interpretation of rights of users, is an
extremely imprecise tool that can easily be wielded by different judges with
very different outcomes. It should also not be forgotten that the balancing
approach is court-mandated, and not set out in the constitution as it is in the
United States”.106 What is needed is a clear, unequivocal pronouncement in
the statute itself, through statutory reform.
Secondly, no matter how broadly and expansively the fair dealing exceptions
are interpreted by Canadian courts, the wording of the Copyright Act itself
has not budged. The judiciary can only work within the bounds of the
narrow boundaries of the Copyright Act. Judge Teitelbaum’s dictum that
the judiciary cannot encroach on Parliament’s role to create new purposes
under fair dealing still rings true today.107 Craig explains, “[t]he onus remains
upon Parliament to continuously develop new exceptions in the face of new
challenges; the role of the courts is to assess whether the case at hand meets
the specific demands of the fair dealing defence”.108 Consequently, an artist’s
use of a copyrighted work may well constitute ‘fair’ dealing within the factors
set out in CCH, but such a victory is futile because she must first fit the
use within the exhaustive purposes. This is compared to the United States,
where courts concentrates on whether a use is ‘fair’ through applying the
four factors instead of judicial pigeon-holing as to the purpose of use. Scassa
cautions that the recent developments are not the end all solution:
The cases do demonstrate a strong commitment by the
Supreme Court of Canada to take into account users
106
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interests, and to some extent, broader societal interest in
interpreting and applying the Act. The decisions, however,
cannot be regarded as an unequivocal victory for users’
rights in Canada…Any balance struck in interpreting
the Act is substantially affected by the balance (or lack of
balance) crafted in the legislation by Parliament.109
Théberge and CCH represent a positive turn for appropriation artists.
However, they are not a substitute to much-needed parliamentary copyright
reform.
For the appropriation artist, the greatest clout that comes out of the recent
Supreme Court of Canada developments lies in a prospective Charter
challenge of the Copyright Act. Although a full examination of the relationship
between freedom of expression and copyright is beyond the scope of this
paper, the possibility of a Charter challenge merits a brief discussion.110 The
Copyright Act has largely avoided Charter scrutiny, apart from the case of
Michelin where the freedom of expression issue was easily dismissed by
the Court. Scholars have fiercely argued that as an act of Parliament, the
Copyright Act must comply with principles of the Charter including the
freedom of expression right. Craig explains, “Section 2(b) of the Charter
constitutionally guarantees freedom of expression, while the Copyright
Act creates an exclusionary interest over the expression of an idea fixed in
tangible form. Put in this way, the question is not whether the Copyright Act
is constitutionally questionable, but, rather, how can it be anything but?”111
Craig attributes this avoidance to an assumption that the Act already
encompasses mechanisms to accord Canadian copyright with freedom of
expression, including the fair dealing provisions and the idea and expression
109
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dichotomy.112 Given the fact that the monopoly right conferred amounts to
a private censorship, as was the case in Michelin, these assumptions clearly
require revisiting. A section 2(b) Charter challenge against the Copyright Act
itself has a greater likelihood of success in a judicial milieu that recognizes the
dual purposes of copyright. For instance, in Michelin the Court identified the
pressing and substantial objective of the Copyright Act as solely “the protection
of authors and ensuring that they are recompensed for their creative energies
and works”.113 In light of the decision of Théberge the public interest objective
would also have to be considered as pressing and substantial for the purposes
of the Oakes analysis. This dual purpose makes an incredible difference in the
balancing process mandated under Oakes:
The key issue would turn on the minimal impairment inquiry – that the
Copyright Act fails to strike an appropriate balance between authors’ rights
and users’ rights. Given that fair dealing provisions do not include parody
as a justifiable purpose, it could be successfully argued that the Act is underinclusive. The potential of a Charter challenge in widening the scope of the
fair dealing provisions is explained by Bailey:
The emphasis in Théberge on users’ rights and the related
importance of access to and use of others’ expression in
the innovation process, could well be used to suggest the
user rights articulated in the Act are under-inclusive. To
the extent, for example, that fair dealing does not include
copying expression that is as socially and politically
important as whistle blowing and parody, the Act may well
restrict more expression than is reasonably necessary.114
Fewer suggests that a likely remedy would be the reading in of the phrase ‘for
purposes including’, and goes as far as arguing the determination of ‘fair’ be
expanded “to embrace otherwise infringing uses that nonetheless lie close to
the core values protected by freedom of expression”.115
112
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Despite a possible Charter challenge of the Copyright Act, such a route has
little practical chance of success. Charter litigation is extremely lengthy and
expensive to fund. It would likely take years before appropriation artists get
a final and favourable decision. Again, the lack of recourse appropriation
artists have, in spite of the promising decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada, shows the need for parliamentary reform. It is incumbent on
Parliament to make the necessary changes so that the Copyright Act reflects
the positive turn made by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Need for Statutory Reform: Moving Towards the American
Fair Use Standard
It is glaringly apparent that the fair dealing exceptions must be remodelled
to reflect the spirit of the Court’s ruling in Théberge and CCH. Until then,
Canadian artists who use postmodern appropriation practices will continue
to work under a regime that stifles creative expression, and the public will
continue to fail to benefit from these socially-integral works. Bill C-60,
introduced in June of 2005 as proposals to copyright reform, was completely
silent on any expansion of the fair use exceptions.116 The government has
completely disregarded the Court’s dictum in CCH, that fair dealing must be
interpreted broadly as a ‘user’s right’.117 This comes as a huge disappointment,
as felt by a coalition of Canadian artists who go by the name of ‘Appropriation
Art’. The following is an excerpt from their June 2006 open letter to the then
Minister of Industry, Maxime Bernier and the then Minister of Canadian
Heritage, Bev Oda,
Artists and other creators require Certainty of Access.
Artists who use appropriation in their practice, rely on
Canada’s fair dealing exception to create. Fair dealing is a
narrow right, perhaps at times too narrow to support this
work. Creators should enjoy the support of the law, and not
have to work under conditions of uncertainty. The work
we speak of here does not compete with that of its subject,
nor does the value of this work derive from the value of its
116
117
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subject. The time has come for the Canadian government
to consider replacing fair dealing with a broader defence,
such as fair use, that will offer artists the certainty they
require to create.118
Bill C-60 was not formally adopted before the dissolution of the Liberal
government in 2005, and a new bill has yet to be tabled. In January, 2007,
Michael Geist gave a presentation on fair use to Canadian Heritage’s
Copyright Policy Branch. Geist’s presentation, entitled ‘The Case for Fair
Use in Canada’, argued that Canada should adopt a fair use standard such as
the United States. He raised seven reasons for the expansion of fair dealing,
such as a consistency with the Supreme Court of Canada’s conception of
copyright, and a consistency with emerging artistic needs and practices.119
Aligning the Canadian fair dealing provision with the American fair use
doctrine is not a flawless, end- all solution. American artists who employ
appropriation practices in their works are still encumbered by threats of
expensive litigation, as evidenced by the hefty $2 million in legal fees incurred
by Forsythe in Mattel.120 Moreover, the fundamental question of whether a
dealing is ‘fair’ is a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry that ultimately comes
down to a particular judge’s determination. This renders the determination
of ‘fair’ susceptible to a judge’s subjective predilections of what constitutes
‘good’ or ‘bad’ art as was seen in the judicial reasoning in Michelin and
Rogers. 121 Despite these inadequacies, a fair dealing provision akin to the
American fair use doctrine would nonetheless be an enormous benefit to
appropriation artists in Canada who currently have little recourse under the
existing Copyright Act. The case law on fair use in respect to appropriation
practices has already been widely established in the United States. The
Canadian jurisprudence would only have to gain from the principled
118 Open letter from Appropriation Art: A Coalition of Art Professionals to Minister of
Industry Maxime Bernier and Minister of Canadian Heritage Bev Oda (6 June, 2006) on
Appropriation Art online: Appropriation Art, http://www.appropriationart.ca/?page_id=3.
119
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reasoning that has evolved since Rogers. A fair use standard would certainly
open up the opportunity for Canadian courts to follow the rather progressive
stance espoused by the American courts in Mattel and Blanch.
Furthermore, as postmodern artistic practices gain recognition in aesthetic
studies, American courts are now giving credence to expert testimony of
art historians and philosophers to help facilitate informed decision-making.
In Mattel the Court relied upon an expert witness report by Douglas
Nickel, an art history expert and curator at the San Francisco Museum
of Modern Art. Nickel’s report provided an account of the traditional
practices of contemporary artists, serving as an insightful backdrop to a
full understanding of Forsythe’s works. Just as psychologists are relied upon
by courts for a better understanding of an accused’s sanity, so can aesthetic
scholars be relied upon for a better understanding of artistic practices.122
An artist’s legal counsel would be astute to take advantage of experts who
are well-versed in the aesthetic discipline. In the famous words of Justice
Holmes, this sort of expert testimony would help a judge learn “the new
language in which [the] author spoke”.123

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is a trite observation that artists are integral to society, to understanding
the intricacies of our values, beliefs, and even our faults. Noted Canadian
scholar, Marshall McLuhan, once wrote, “I think of art, at its most significant,
as a DEW line, a Distant Early Warning system that can always be relied
on to tell the old culture what is beginning to happen to it”.124 The current
Canadian copyright regime is failing both artists and the society that ought
to benefit from creative works. Despite a clear decree by the Supreme Court
122
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of Canada, the only realistic avenue towards allowing appropriation practices
is through parliamentary reform akin to the American fair use doctrine.
Until then, the Distant Early Warning system will continue to be crippled by
a regime that should instead help it flourish.
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